In this paper, we first present the state and the development of the European capital and current account imbalances. We demonstrate how large the heterogeneity among European countries is and that clustering here different types of countries is possible, but that it leads to different groupings than what has been labeled the PIGS or better GIPS countries on the one side and the GLNF countries on the other side. The same applies when it comes to cluster countries according to the debt ratio criterion. Hereafter, we put forward our own description of the mentioned ECB implicit financing scheme(s), among other things extending and complementing the recent base money market (supply and demand) analysis given by H.-W. Sinn and T. Wollmershäuser (2011). The core of the paper consists in a modified model of the New Austrian School of Economics -in the tradition of F. A. v. Hayek (1929 A. v. Hayek ( , 1931 and in the vein of R. M. Garrison (2002) -which enables us to discuss the current distortions introduced by the Target2 credit channel into the capital markets of selected EMU countries and to detect its most important economic consequences. This part of the paper ends with a static welfare evaluation. Finally, we come up with some conclusions and suggestions for economic policy.
the PIGS or better GIPS countries on the one side and the GLNF countries on the other side. The same applies when it comes to cluster countries according to the debt ratio criterion.
In the third section, we will present our own description of the mentioned ECB implicit financing scheme(s), among other things extending and complementing the recent base money market (supply and demand) analysis given by Hans-Werner Sinn and Timo Wollmershäuser (2011) .
In the fourth section, we will make use of a modified model of the New Austrian School of Economics -in the tradition of Friedrich A. v. Hayek (1929 A. v. Hayek ( , 1931 and in the vein of Roger M. Garrison (2002) -which enables us to discuss the current distortions introduced by the Target2 credit channel into the capital markets of selected EMU countries and to detect its most important economic consequences. This part of the paper ends with a static welfare evaluation.
The fifth section comes up with some conclusions and suggestions for economic policy.
Inter-Eurosystem Capital and Current Account Imbalances
Since the introduction of the common European currency in 2002, the current account imbalances of the Eurosystem member states increased significantly, amongst other things due to the disappearance of any exchange rate risk. Concerning trade, Germany is one of the countries mostly profiting from the Euro, whereas part of the GIPS countries suffer from their loss of monetary policy control and especially from the omission of the possibility of currency depreciation. The divergence of country specific interest rates in the capital market makes another contribution to this misery.
To show the countries' diversification and therefore the European heterogeneity, Figure 1 contrasts the current account imbalances of the Euro countries and their capital account imbalances at the end of 2009 (up-to-date final data is not available). The positive part of the vertical axis shows current account surpluses, the negative part current account deficits. The capital account surpluses can be seen on the right part of the horizontal axis, capital account deficits on the left. Germany, for example, can be found in the northwestern quadrant, meaning it has a current account surplus and a capital account deficit (net capital outflows), whereas Greece (on the bottom right) has a current account deficit and net capital inflows. As we will see below, this is exactly the situation one considers as Target2 liabilities enter the balance of payments as capital import and Target2 claims enter as capital export. Tables and IMF World Economic Outlook database, own depiction.
Besides, as it is already shown in several recent papers, the current account surpluses of Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and -with respect to the capital account imbalanceoutlier Finland (GLNF), the countries with the largest Target2 claims, approximately correspond to the accumulated current account deficits of the GIPS countries. Figure 2 pictures this fact. 1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 Mrd. USD
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011, own depiction.
One can only identify small deviations between the two curve shapes. But from Figure 1 one has to recognize that the clusters of GIPS and GLNF were built solely on the basis of Target2 balances (see Figure 4 ). An aggregation on the basis of the capital account imbalances or the current account imbalances would differ. Also the domestic debt rating would show a totally different aggregation of countries (see Figure 3 ). Lots of countries are located between GIPS (black framed) and GLNF (black).
But the consideration of the governmental debt level is not unnecessary, because it isinter alia -responsible for the yield spreads of government bonds in the capital market and therefore effects the financing options of a country, e.g. the possibilities to pay a current account deficit. And unlike Storbeck (2011) blogged in June, every current account deficit has to be financed by a capital account surplus meaning by net capital inflows, also in a monetary union. This is simply the mechanism of the balance of payments theory. And this is exactly the crucial point where Target2 comes into play as one financing option -as Sinn calls it. Furthermore, that is why the two country clusters were built on the basis of Target2 balances and not on the basis of balance of payments data or debt ratios.
The Target2 mechanism and the respective national Target2 balances are the facts we focus on.
Target2 and its Importance as "Stealth Bailout"
Similarly to the current account imbalances in the Eurosystem, it is already known what countries record Target2 surpluses and what countries are the beneficiaries of this possibility to finance themselves via the ECB. Figure 4 shows the balances of Target2 as identified at the end of 2010. As expected, Germany is far and away the largest creditor to the system, the GIPS countries are the largest debtors. But what are the Target2 balances? Where do they come from, and how does this payment system work? We will give a short overview of the most important facts on this system:
Since the end of 2007, Target2 is the successor mechanism of Target, the original payment system of the Eurosystem, meaning "Trans-European Automated Realtime Gross settlement Every payment between commercial banks in two Euro countries has to be transferred via the national central banks and the ECB. A direct payment transfer from one commercial bank to a foreign commercial bank is not possible.
In April, Ruhkamp (2011) designed an example to illustrate the payment flows from one institution to another. Since then, this example was used several times for argumentation in the discussion on Target2: A foreign company (originally it was an Irish farmer, in Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) it is a Greek transport company) buys a German vehicle. We Sinn to call the financing via Target2 a "stealth bailout" (2011a). During the years,
Target2 balances began to rise (surpluses grew as well as deficits). The preliminary result is the already shown situation in Figure 4 . Bindseil and König (2011, p. 21) pointed out that even before 2007 current account deficits existed and Target2 imbalances would have been possible. In general, this statement is true. But they ignored the fact that prior to the crisis the financial crosscurrents took place on the private capital market, wherefore the Target2 balances were unimportant as they are only one possibility to finance current account deficits (see Buiter et al. 2011, p. 13 ). Furthermore, Bindseil and König (2011) as well as Buiter et al. (2011) all did the same error in reasoning when arguing that the current account deficit of a single country does not correspond to the respective Target2 liability. Of course it does not: the Target mechanism/argumentation works on the aggregate level.
But what effects do the Target2 balances have on the national money markets? How is it possible to show the rearrangement of base money between the Target2 creditor and the debtor countries, the destroying and creating of base money?
We will describe the effect of Target2 balances on the base money market, in part following Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) . Figure 6 shows the base money market for countries with Target2 claims against the ECB, here namely the largest claim holders Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Finland (GLNF). The demand curve is a curve with negative slope due to the fact that the interest rate can be interpreted as opportunity costs of holding money: The higher the interest rate is, the less banks demand money. The monetary base in general consists of the money in circulation and the reserves that com-mercial banks hold at the central bank. At the given main refinancing rate there exists a kind of natural limit to the base money demand depending on "the economic activity and the payment habits prevailing in the country" (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, p. 18 ). Because Target2 claims belong to the monetary base, commercial banks now demand less original base money (OBM) via refinancing instruments, whereas original base money means money that is created via foreign currency and/or gold purchases and refinancing operations (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, p. 9 ). In Figure 6 this lower demand for base money is shown as a shift of the refinancing demand curve to the left in the extent of the Target2 claims. Without Target2 balances a country would have asked the amount OBM 0 completely via the refinancing instruments of the central bank, with holding Tar-get2 claims TC this amount is reduced to OBM 1 . Sinn and Wollmershäuser call this a "crowding out of refinancing credit (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, p. 19) . The total demand for base money is constant, only the source of base money changes. In credi-tor countries, part of the base money is the money created via Target2 as we explained above in Figure 5 . Buiter et al. (2011) tried to contradict Sinn's argumentation at this point by stating that this crowding out and the constant base money are just one possible scenario. But effectively they tell the same in different words. In their view, it is the choice of banks in the GLNF countries to demand original base money additionally to their Target2 claims, there does not have to be a crowding out (Buiter et al. 2011, p. 8) . Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) pose it the other way round, arguing that not the base money supply is restricted, but the decision is about the base money demand at a certain interest rate. In both argumentations the quintessence is: the decision about a possible "crowding out of refinancing credit" is made by the commercial banks in the GLNF countries and therefore on the demand side (endogenously determined); it is not a caused one by the GLNF central banks. Maybe the wording "crowding out" in this situation is a little misleading because usually this term is used for forced action and not for action on own decisions.
Analogously, we can depict the base money market for the GIPS countries. This is done in Figure 7 . Target2 liabilities to the ECB can be pictured as "negative base money" since Target2 claims are "positive base money" and Target2 liabilities mean destroying base money. Without the existence of Target2 balances a country asks for the amount of OBM 0 at the given main refinancing rate. If the country holds Target2 liabilities, this amount TL has to be demanded additionally. In our figure, this means a shift of the demand curve to the right (the dashed demand curve) in the extent of the Target2 liabilities. The original base money demand expands to OBM 1 in contrast to the creditor countries, where the original base money demand is reduced, because the additional base money can only be demanded via the central bank's refinancing operations. The ECB is not able to control this re-distribution of base money from one country to another; at best the total amount via refinancing operations could be fixed at some extent. But since October 2008 this is not the case: The ECB decided that "the weekly main refinancing operations will be carried out through a fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment at the inter-est rate on the main refinancing operation" (European Central Bank 2008). In June 2011, the ECB affirms "to continue conducting its main refinancing operations (MROs) as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, and at least until the end of the ninth maintenance period of 2011 on 11
October 2011" (European Central Bank 2011). For the national central banks of Target2 debtor countries the promise of full allotment does not give any incentive to directly care about the Target2 liabilities because financing via the ECB is possible to any scope at nearly any time (depending only on the calendar for tender operations).
In the next part of this paper, we will see how the expanded monetary base of the GIPS countries and the lower demand for base money in the Target2 creditor countries (GLNF) can be integrated into the capital market of the New Austrian Economics Model.
The New Austrian Economics Model of the Capital
Market and its Application to the European Debt Crisis
Introduction: The one country equilibrium case
The following three diagrams in Figure 8 depict the situation of a single closed economy in total equilibrium as it follows from the New Austrian approach of economics: at the bottom, we have the classical capital market where the intersection between Savings S(i) and Investment I(i) determines the interest rate in equilibrium, i * (the natural rate of interest). Above this diagram, we find the overall production possibilities curve. Point A denotes the actual division of production between investment goods and consumer goods.
The last diagram on the left side represents v. Hayek's famous triangle: The horizontal leg of this triangle measures (read from left to right) "goods in process moving through time from the inception to the completion of the production process" (Garrison 2002, p. 47) . It can also be seen to represent "the separate stages of production" (ibid.), starting with the early and ending with the final stages. The vertical leg/axis stands for the output of consumer goods which can be produced, once the beginning of the production process (point A on the horizontal leg) is defined. The surface between the hypotenuse Sources: Garrison 2002 , Sell 2010 The logic of the diagrams has to be understood from the bottom to the top and then from the right to the left: in the first place, the capital market determines the equilibrium size of savings and investment and the equilibrium rate of interest. Given the production possibilities frontier, the amount of available consumer goods is then determined. Given the rate of interest and hence the angle α, the point A is determined in v. Hayek's triangle which stands for the implicit length of the production process. Now let us assume that the original equilibrium is destroyed as a result of a change in the time preference of households: the savings function shifts to the right to its new position S(i'), the equilibrium interest rate comes down to its new level i * ', investment raises according to point B on the production possibilities function. The output of consumer goods necessarily falls; the now lower interest rate "favors relatively long-term investment. Resources are bid away from late stages of production, where demand is weak because of the currently low consumption, and into early stages, where demand is strong because of the lower rate of interest" (Garrison 2002, p. 63) . Correspondingly, the new point B on the horizontal leg of the triangle is located to the left of point A and the new angle β is smaller than α. This is about the same statement as recognizing that the natural rate of interest has fallen on the capital market and/or that the productivity of intermediate goods is now lower than it once was before. Notice that the increased saving makes a strengthened future demand for consumption possible and that the growth rate of the economy will be higher after the capital restructuring than it was before (ibid., pp. 63/64).
These "macroeconomics of capital structure" will now be extended in order to analyze the effects of Target2 balances on EMU. To do so, we will create a two countries/two areas framework, a task which, to our knowledge, introduces an innovation into the diagrammatic framework of the New Austrian model of economics.
The two countries disequilibrium case
There are two areas within EMU, one (on the left hand side of Figure 9 ) which is characterized by high interest rates, low domestic savings, and a high potential for commercial capital imports and a second one (on the right hand side of Figure 9 ) with inverse properties (high savings, low interest rates and a high potential for capital exports). In the following, we analyze the three scenarios which are relevant for our subject: i.e. by the money-printing press." (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, p. 32) In our subsequent analysis we simplify things and assume that 100% of the current account deficit was financed by the Target balances.
Due to the expansionary (contractive) effects of Target2 liabilities (claims) on the original monetary base in the GIPS (GLNF) area, the effective market rate of interest falls (rises) below (above) the natural rate in the GIPS (GLNF) countries. It is an increased (lowered) supply of loanable funds which causes the interest rate to fall (rise). The newly created central bank money through Target2 (∆M T ) drives a wedge between saving and investment: consumers in the GIPS (GLNF) countries take their decisions according to their respective savings function, investors analogously according to their respective overall investment function. There is now an excess demand ED (excess supply ES) for consumer goods in the GIPS (GNLF) area. As Figure 9 demonstrates, the concomitant excess demand (supply) of consumer goods in the GIPS (GLNF) countries together with the increase, +∆I (drop, −∆I), in investment expenditures in the GIPS (GLNF) countries matches the increase in Target2 liabilities (claims) respectively. The impact on v.
Hayek's triangle and the structure of capital is about the same as in scenario (i), but quite different to that first scenario, the impact on the capital structure in the GLNF countries is now "involuntary", mildly spoken. Notice also that the productivity of intermediate goods as measured previously by the angle α (β) is now lower (higher) in the GIPS (GLNF) countries as γ < α (δ > β).
Opposite to the first scenario, the impact of the now functioning Target2 mechanism forces the GLNF countries into an involuntary excess supply in the production of consumer goods going along with a reduction of their domestic investment expenditures. In other words:
the GIPS countries are now in the position to enforce in their own economies -via the Target2 operations -an excess demand for consumer goods going along with an increase in investment expenditures.
A Static welfare evaluation of Target2
In Figure 10 , we have now the possibility to compare our three scenarios (with rearranged numbering) in terms of static welfare, i.e. rent units: 2 (i) The years mid-2007 through 2011 if Target2 would not have been operative are represented by the equilibria "in autarky" G and G'; these solutions serve here forth as a reference for the subsequent welfare evaluation.
(ii) The years 1999 through mid-2007 led to capital inflows (outflows) in the size of FH or H'F' respectively; in both economic clusters we record a net welfare gain corresponding to the triangles FGH and H'F'G' (vertically dashed), a result which is very well known from economic textbooks. In the GIPS countries, the gains 2 The following analysis differs at least in two aspects from Sinn (2010) : first, we model flows of savings/investment instead of flows of capital goods. Second, we disregard from the "overheating effects" which are associated with the financing of investment expenditures by the GLNF countries in the GIPS countries. As Sinn shows, such overshooting of capital outflows creates losses in GDP per capita terms (ibid., p. 13) for the capital exporting countries.
in investors' rent (gray shaded) outweigh the losses in savers' rent (AGFB) while in the GLNF countries the gains in savers' rent (B'F'G'A') outweigh the losses in investors' rent (gray shaded, too). We are aware of the fact that this welfare balance is somewhat optimistic (see footnote 2).
(iii) The years mid-2007 through 2011 with Target2 being operative and effective are somewhat more complicated to be evaluated: starting with the GIPS countries, there are gains in investors' rent to an amount of AGHB (gray shaded, identical with scenario (ii)). At the same time, there are now gains in rent which accrue both to savers, but also to the Target2 mechanism corresponding to the difference between the area KFHN (diagonally dashed) and the area AGFB (horizontally dashed).
Overall, we find gains in savers' and Target2 rent so that the Target2 scenario leads to net welfare gains for the GIPS countries which exceed the gains of the second scenario. Source: Own depiction inspired by Brakman et al. 2006, p. 192. In contrast, the GLNF countries suffer from net welfare losses due to the Target2 mechanism: the small area of gains which accrue to savers and Target2 
Some Conclusions and Suggestions for Economic

Policy
As our paper confirms, Target2 balances tend to make endogenous, if not the size of the monetary base in the Euro area, truly its composition. Notice that -opposite to the theory of the (exogenous) money multiplier -it is the process of credit and book money creation within commercial banks which drives (the composition of) the monetary base via the Target2 mechanism.
Moreover, the initial direction of causation seems to run from the business sector in countries severely affected by the European debt crisis to their local bank and from there to the respective national central bank. If so, then there is a striking similarity -to the best of our knowledge not yet discovered by other authors on this subject -to the theory of inertial inflation (Blejer and Cheasty 1987; Bresser Perreira and Nakano 1987; Sell 1990 ): here, companies which act on markets with rather imperfect competition have to face a continuous process of cost increase fueled by indexation schemes (of wages, interest rates, the exchange rate, etc.). They intend to pass the cost increase on prices. Also, they need credit from their local banks to finance working capital and to roll over the firm's debt. These local banks, in turn, push the central bank to enhance the possibilities of refinancing and to provide enough liquidity. Thereby, the money supply becomes fully endogenous and the central bank simply accommodates the price increases on product markets.
Of course, it is true that also capital flight is represented in the Target2 balances. This issue is addressed by Buiter et al. (2011) and more recently by Abad et al. (2011) So what about a change in ECB's main refinancing operations to reduce the "ECB's stealth bailout"? Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) think that neither the renunciation of the full allotment policy of the current fixed rate tender nor a change to a variable interest rate tender would help reducing the Target2 imbalances, because "it would not be able to prevent the least solid commercial banks from making the highest interest rate offers because anything they offer is more favourable than the excessively high interest rates they have to offer private lenders. The lion's share of the central bank credit would therefore still be created in the GIPS countries." Wollmershäuser 2011, p. 43) Buiter et al. (2011, p. 4) agree with this statement but use another argumentation: As long as commercial banks have enough eligible assets as collateral they are able to get liquidity at full allotment via the marginal lending facility even if the main refinancing operation volumes were limited.
Therefore Target2 imbalances were "independent" of the main refinancing operations'
shaping.
Changes in the main refinancing operations do not have any short-run significant effect on the refinancing possibilities of commercial banks. But one has to recognize that financing via the marginal lending facility is much more expensive (even during the acute crisis the interest rate corridor held, meaning the lending rate provides the ceiling for overnight lending) and that it is only an overnight solution for liquidity scarcity. Figure 11 shows the volumes of the main refinancing operations, the marginal lending facility, and the deposit facility since the beginning of the monetary union. Before the financial crisis, the volumes in the deposit facility showed neither fluctuations nor a trend; they were nearly negligible. The volumes in the marginal lending facility fluctuated at the beginning of the Eurosystem but calmed with the change from a fixed rate tender to a variable rate tender. The start of the financial crisis can be identified very easy. The loss in trustworthiness of the interbank market is reflected by the large upward deflections of the volumes of the deposit facility as well as those of the marginal lending facility. The change back to a fixed rate tender (here with full allotment) was implemented in October 2008, after the marginal lending facility peaked. Times of high fluctuations in the marginal lending facility's volumes were only at the beginning of the monetary union and during the financial crisis (during both periods the ECB used a fixed rate tender). When the ECB operated its main refinancing operations via a variable rate tender, the marginal lending facility was less used. Therefore there is no indication that commercial banks use -or will use -the marginal lending facility to get liquidity with "full allotment" even if the ECB limits it via its main refinancing operations, especially not if the interest rates rise again. Nevertheless, the ECB will not be able to reduce its "stealth bailout" by changing the shape of its main refinancing operations.
But the self-servicing attitude among the GIPS countries should be banned by the ECB: a mechanism which favors countries with Target2 claims and penalizes countries with Target2 liabilities should be designed and installed. For instance a penalty could be to temporarily exclude those countries from refinancing operations that are reluctant to balance their Target2 liabilities with the ECB in an appropriate time span.
The ECB itself should be encouraged to publish data on Target2 balances in order to increase the transparency of its monetary policy. But transparency is not enough: In the context of the European debt crisis the ECB should go back to its earlier policy of asking for sufficient quality of the collateral involved in refinancing operations. This goes far beyond the Target2 problem and affects the long-term reputation of the ECB, which has been damaged during the European debt crisis.
For example, the "ECB allowed the Greek state to run a gigantic budget deficit ... by resorting to the European money-printing press" (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, p. 25) via Target2. This construction weakness of the EMU points at the urgent necessity to reformulate and strengthen the European Stability and Growth Pact, whose major intention should be to limit public deficits and to bring down the huge debt to GDP ratios in the European area.
Last, but not least: Following classical economists, any turbulence in the monetary sphere is just a mirror of distortions and malfunctions in the "real" sphere of the economy: If a key problem underlying the Target2 mechanism is the fact that GIPS countries wish to import more goods than they export, it is indispensable that these countries search for new comparative advantages in goods and services. This applies to every exchange rate regime they may choose in the foreseeable future.
